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SYMPOSIUM/ARTICLES
THE ORIGINS OF CCTLD POLICYMAKING
Peter K. Yu *
A long time ago in a galaxy not so far away, there was a decen-
tralized global network of computers. These computers shared in-
formation with each other regardless of how far apart they were
and whether there was any direct line of communication between
them. In the very beginning, this network was used exclusively by
government and military agencies, educational and research insti-
tutions, government contractors, scientists, and technology special-
ists.1 Instead of the domain names we use today, such as "www.
amazon.com," users typed in numeric addresses, such as
* Copyright © 2004 Peter K. Yu. All Rights Reserved. Associate Professor of Law &
Director, Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program, Michigan State Univer-
sity College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, Information Studies and
Media & Faculty Associate, James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for Telecommunication
Management & Law, College of Communication Arts & Sciences, Michigan State Univer-
sity; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. The Author organized the "ICANN, ccTLD,
and the Legacy Root: Domain Name Lawmaking and Governance in the New Millen-
nium" Symposium when he was Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Executive Director of
the Intellectual Property Law Program, and Deputy Director of the Howard M. Squadron
Program in Law, Media & Society at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity. He would like to thank past and present members of the Cardozo Journal of Inter-
national & Comparative Law, in particular Elizabeth Bullard and Montgomery Engel, for
assistance in making this event possible. He is grateful to Kenneth Cukier, Tamar Frankel,
Michael Geist, Milton Mueller, Erica Schlesinger Wass, and in particular Jonathan Wein-
berg, for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Essay. He also is
indebted to the editors of, and contributors to, ICANNWatch for providing frequent up-
dates and insightful analyses on issues concerning ICANN and the international domain
name system. This Essay is an update of Peter K. Yu, The Never-ending ccTLD Story, in
ADDRESSING THE WORLD: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNET COUNTRY CODE Do-
MAINS (Erica Schlesinger Wass ed., 2003).
1 For interesting discussion of the origins of the Internet, see generally TIM BERNERS-
LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB (2000); KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY
Up LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996); JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET YEARS IN A LIFETIME (2000); Barry M.
Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/
brief.shtml (Aug. 4, 2000).
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"123.45.67.89," and, later, host names to send information to other
computers.2
This network soon expanded, and domain names became a
practical necessity.3 There are at least two reasons. First, alphanu-
meric texts are generally easier for humans to remember than
numeric addresses. Second, as Internet traffic increases and com-
puter systems are reconfigured, the computer server used for a par-
ticular Web site may change from time to time. In fact, some busy
Web sites might use multiple servers, requiring them to take turns
to address requests directed to a single domain name. While the
Web site owner (or his or her technical staff) might know internally
to which numeric address the Web site corresponds at a particular
moment, the general public does not. Domain names are therefore
needed for identification purposes.
Although domain names are easy for humans to remember,
computers do not understand these catchy names. Instead, com-
puters have to "translate" these names back to numeric addresses
before locating the information the users requested. To maximize
efficiency and minimize storage, the Domain Name System
("DNS") was designed as a hierarchy, like a pyramid. To "resolve"
a domain name, the computer issues a query to the name server at
the bottom of the hierarchy. If the computer fails to obtain an an-
swer, it will move up the hierarchy. If the computer still does not
obtain an answer, it will continue to move up the hierarchy until it
finally succeeds.
At the apex of this hierarchy is a set of thirteen legacy root
zone servers, which identify the name servers storing the root zone
files for all the top-level domains, including both the generic do-
2 The use of host names dates back to 1974. See M.D. Kudlick, Host Names On-Line
(Network Working Group, Request for Comments No. 608) (Jan. 10, 1974), available at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc608.txt. By 1977, the use of numeric addresses was
"strongly discouraged." David H. Crocker et al., Standard for the Format of Arpa Net-
work Text Messages (1) 19 (Network Working Group, Request for Comments No. 733)
(Nov. 21, 1977), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc733.txt. See also Jonathan
Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 194-195 (2000) (dis-
cussing pre-DNS Internet addressing).
3 See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 39-40 (2002) [hereinafter MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT]. As
Craig Partridge, the chief scientist of BBN Technologies, recalled: "When we got to about
two thousand hosts, that's when things really started to come apart. Instead of having one
big mainframe with twenty thousand people on it, suddenly we were getting inundated
with individual machines, and everyone wanted to be named Frodo." HAFNER & LYON,
supra note 1, at 252.
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mains-such as ".com," .net," or ".org"-and country-code top-
level domains ("ccTLDs")-such as ".cn" (China), ".fr" (France),
and ".tv" (Tuvalu).4 Each of these servers is assigned a letter from
A to M. For example, the Internet Systems Consortium operates
the "F Root Server," and the server in London is called the "K
Root Server." More than three-quarters of these servers are lo-
cated in the United States, and the rest are found in Japan, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom.
To perform its identifying function, a domain name needs to
be unique. Thus, all root zone files must contain identical data.5
As a past legacy, the database in the A Root Server, which the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") currently controls by virtue of its contract with the
U.S. Department of Commerce ("DoC"), is considered authorita-
tive. The other root servers merely copy this root zone file to their
servers.
Due to this hierarchy and the lucrative market created by the
sale of domain names, there has been an ongoing power struggle
over the control of the DNS and authority to delegate and adminis-
ter ccTLDs. This Essay recounts the story of this struggle, tracing
how ccTLD policymaking has been transformed from ad hoc, in-
formal coordination to international, contract-based governance.
The Essay also discusses the various major players in the ccTLD
debate: ICANN, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
("IANA"), ccTLD managers, national governments, the Interna-
4 For the location of these root servers, see Internet Domain Names: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
(107th Cong. 2001) (statement of Michael M. Roberts, President and CEO, ICANN),
available at http://www.icann.org/correspondence/roberts-testimony-14feb01.htm. To en-
hance Internet response times and reduce the vulnerability of the Internet root server sys-
tem to malicious attacks, the Internet Systems Consortium recently deployed new root
servers by replicating the F Root Server it currently operates. In 2003, ISC deployed sev-
enteen new F root server sites around the world. ISC plans to deploy twelve additional
sites in 2004. See Press Release, Internet Systems Consortium, APNIC and APJII Install
First Root Nameserver in Jakarta, Indonesia, at http://www.isc.org/about/press/?pr=200407
2700 (July 27, 2004). The more recent server sites are located in Brisbane, Australia; To-
ronto, Canada; Monterrey, Mexico; Lisbon, Portugal; Tel Aviv, Israel; and Jakarta,
Indonesia.
5 See ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS (July 9, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm (noting that "[f]rom the inception of the DNS,
its most fundamental design goal has been to provide the same answers to the same queries
issued from any place on the Internet"). But see infra note 83 (discussing alternative root
servers).
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tional Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), and the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization ("WIPO").
The ccTLD policymaking story began when scientists, includ-
ing Jon Postel and Paul Mockapetris, developed the DNS in 1983.6
Under a contract with the U.S. government, Postel, and later
JANA, managed the DNS and delegated ccTLDs to foreign man-
agers.7 The first ccTLD, ".us," was created and delegated in March
1985.8 Two other delegations, ".uk" (United Kingdom) and ".il"
(Israel), followed in the same year.
At that time, very few countries were connected to the In-
ternet backbone, and most of them did not need a ccTLD. Even
when they needed one, ccTLD delegations usually fell into the
hands of university computer science departments or educational
and research networking organizations, rather than government
agencies or organizations that historically provided postal, tele-
phone, or telegraph services. 9
From 1985 to 1993, Postel delegated ccTLDs on a first-come,
first-served basis. Using the notion of a "responsible person," Pos-
tel required very limited basic administrative criteria before he del-
egated a ccTLD. As he wrote, the person in charge of assigning
second-level domain names "is generally the first person that asks
for the job (and is somehow considered a 'responsible person')." 10
To avoid political problems, Postel used the ISO 3166-1 coun-
try codes to define what entity would warrant a ccTLD. u Because
these codes were provided by the International Organization for
Standardization, an international association of national standard-
6 See Paul Mockapetris, Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities (Network Working
Group, Request for Comments No. 882) (Nov. 1983), available at http://www.rfc-editor.
org/rfc/rfc882.txt.
7 See Jon Postel, Assigned Numbers (Network Working Group, Request for Com-
ments No. 790) (Sept. 1981), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc790.txt; Vinton
Cerf, IAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identifier Assignment and IAB
Recommended Policy Change to Internet "Connected" Status 1 (Network Working Group,
Request for Comments No. 1174) (Aug. 1990), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfcll74.txt. IANA was first mentioned in RFC 1083 in 1988. Internet Activities Board,
IAB Official Protocol Standards 9 (Network Working Group, Request for Comments No.
1083) (Dec. 1988), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1083.txt.
8 For the dates of ccTLD delegations, see DNSO, ICANN, History of the Internet:
ccTLDs in Chronological Order of Top Level Domain Creation at the InterNIC, at http://
www.cctld.dnso.icann.org/ccwhois/cctld/ccTLDs-by-date.html (Nov. 7, 2002).
9 See MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 88.
10 See id. at 88-89 (quoting Postel).
11 The list of ISO 3166-1 country codes is available at http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/prods-
services/iso3l66ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/list-enl.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
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setting bodies, their objectivity successfully shielded IANA from
the political pressure of deciding what was and was not a country.
Although the use of ISO 3166-1 codes appears systematic and
well planned, the ".uk" ccTLD betrayed the ad hoc nature of early
ccTLD policymaking. 12 The ISO 3166-1 country code for the
United Kingdom is ".gb" (for "Great Britain"); yet, Postel assigned
".uk" as the country's ccTLD. Moreover, during a brief period in
1996, IANA delegated codes under the ISO 3166 reserve list, which
the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency reserved specifically for postal
purposes.
13
Notwithstanding the ad hoc nature of ccTLD delegation, con-
flicts rarely arose. Even if they did, when two parties competed for
the same ccTLD, Postel usually succeeded in using subtle pressure
to induce disputing parties to settle the issue before delegation. 4
As IANA reasoned in a later document, dispute resolution "is usu-
ally a long drawn out process, leaving at least one party unhappy,
so it is far better when the parties can reach an agreement among
themselves. "15
By the early 1990s, the Internet had exploded onto the world
stage. As more countries became connected and as national gov-
ernments (and private companies) began to realize the full socio-
economic potential of a ccTLD, requests for ccTLD delegations
increased substantially. The number of delegations went from
forty-six in 1990 to 108 in 1993. By the mid-1990s, IANA had dele-
gated the ccTLDs for virtually all existing countries, including
those with very limited Internet access. 6
With the increase in interest in ccTLDs, a more explicit dele-
gation and administration policy was in order. In March 1994, Pos-
tel published RFC 1591, which described his delegation and
12 See John Klensin, Reflections on the DNS, RFC 1591, and Categories of Domains 6
(Network Working Group, Request for Comments No. 3071) (Feb. 2001) thereinafter RFC
3071], available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3071.txt (stating that the .uk ccTLD pre-
dates the adoption of the ISO 3166-1 codes).
13 Examples of these ccTLDs include ".ac" (for Ascension Island), ".gg" (for Guern-
sey), ".im" (for the Isle of Man), and ".je" (for Jersey). See Kim G. von Arx & Gregory R.
Hagen, Sovereign Domains: A Declaration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Con-
trol, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 40 n.86 (2002), available at http://www.law.richmond.edu/
jolt/v9il/article4.html; see also RFC 3071, supra note 12, at 6 (recognizing that these excep-
tions "are arguably, at least in retrospect, just mistakes").
14 MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 89.
15 IANA, ccTLD News Memo #1 (Oct. 23, 1997), available at http://www.iana.org/cctld/
cctld-newsl.htm.
16 MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 127.
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administration policy. 17 It stated, first and foremost, that there
must be a designated manager for supervising the ccTLD name
space, and the administrative contact must reside in the country.
Because the manager is the "trustee" for both the nation and the
global Internet community, the manager must be equitable to all
those who request a domain name. In addition, the manager must
do a "satisfactory job" of operating the DNS service for the do-
main, and "significantly interested parties" in the domain must
agree that the delegation is appropriate.
Moreover, RFC 1591 ensured that IANA would strictly ad-
here to the ISO 3166-1 list as the basis of ccTLD delegations. As
the document stated, "IANA is not in the business of deciding
what is and what is not a country. ' 18 Should a dispute arise, IANA
would "tr[y] to have any contending parties reach agreement
among themselves, and generally take[ ] no action to change things
unless all the contending parties agree." 19 IANA would only inter-
vene "in cases where the designated manager has substantially mis-
behaved,"20 although RFC 1591 did not indicate what constituted
misbehavior or substantial misbehavior.
17 Jon Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (Network Working
Group, Request for Comments No. 1591) (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter RFC 1591], available at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1591.txt. RFC stands for "Request for Comments." Al-
though RFCs were sometimes published in final form, they generally "were intended to be
an informal fast distribution way to share ideas with other network researchers." Leiner et
al., supra note 1. As Don Mitchell described, the RFC process was a "sometimes brutal
process of someone advancing an idea and everyone beating on it until the group consen-
sus was that it would work." MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 94 (quoting
interview with Don Mitchell). Once a consensus was achieved, the RFC would become an
Internet standard until it was replaced by another RFC. For a detailed discussion of RFCs
and Internet standard-making, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.
Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REv. 749 (2003) [hereinafter
Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net]. As RFC 1718 stated: "There are ... two special
sub-series within the RFCs: FYIs and STDs. The For Your Information RFC sub-series
was created to document overviews and topics which are introductory. ... The STD RFC
sub-series was created to identify those RFCs which do in fact specify Internet standards."
IETF Secretariat et al., The Tao of IETF: A Guide for New Attendees of the Internet
Engineering Task Force 15 (Network Working Group, Request for Comments No. 1718)
(Nov. 1994), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcl7l8.txt. Thus, not all RFCs are
Internet standards, although all Internet standards are RFCs.
18 RFC 1591, supra note 17.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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Since the publication of RFC 1591, IANA has issued a number
of ccTLD News Memos.21 Although many of these memos were
issued for communication purposes, the first memo addressed the
relationship between ccTLD managers and national governments.
It stated that IANA "takes the desires of the government of the
country very seriously, and will take them as a major consideration
in any transition discussion. 22
Notwithstanding RFC 1591 and the first ccTLD News Memo,
controversies existed. For example, RFC 1591 required that
ccTLD managers reside in the requested domain. Yet, a British
company successfully registered Libya's ccTLD, ".ly," by listing its
owner's Tripoli address as the address of the administrative con-
tact.23 In addition, IANA has delegated ccTLDs to unaccountable
commercial entities that had limited ties to the concerned domain.
Out of recourse from IANA, the government of Bhutan sought as-
sistance from the ITU, the United Nations-affiliated body that gov-
erns international telecommunications matters, to reclaim its
ccTLD, ".bt."14 Even worse, IANA was dragged into domestic dis-
putes and had to make arbitrary decisions concerning Haiti's
ccTLD ".ht,"25 which IANA eventually redelegated in January
2004.6
21 All the ccTLD News Memos are available at http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-
news.htm. The first memo appeared in October 1997. Four others were published in the
next two years. The sixth memo came in October 2001, after a three-year hiatus. Released
in the wake of the 2001 ICANN meeting in Los Angeles, this memo invited ccTLD manag-
ers to "initiate a bottom-up effort to assess and improve ccTLD registry security practices."
Disappointedly though, the Los Angeles conference focused primarily on online security
issues as a result of the September 11th terrorist attacks and sidestepped important ac-
countability and ccTLD matters. See Verne Kopytoff, ICANN Forum Warns of Web Vul-
nerability, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 2001, at lB. In February 2003, in the wake of its contract
renewal with the DoC, IANA published its seventh memo, discussing Internationalized, or
multilingual, domain names and its ccTLD database. IANA, ccTLD News Memo #7 (Feb.
1, 2003), available at http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-news7.htm.
22 IANA, ccTLD News Memo #1, supra note 15.
23 MUELLER, RULING THE RoOT, supra note 3, at 127, 283 n.31. In June 2004, ICANN
approved the partial redelegation of Libya's ".ly." See infra note 55 and accompanying
text.
24 KENNETH NEIL CUKIER, EMINENT DOMAIN: INITIAL POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON NA-
TIONALIZING: COUNTRY-CODE INTERNET ADDRESSES 4 (2002), available at http://inet2002.
org/CD-ROMllu65rw2n/papers/g03-b.pdf.
25 John S. Quarterman, Haiti and Internet Governance, MATRIX NEWS, at http://www.
mids.org/mn/705/ht.html (May 1997).
26 IANA, IANA REPORT ON REDELEGATION OF THE .HT ToP-LEVEL DOMAIN (2004),
available at http://www.iana.org/reports/ht-report-13janO4.htm; see also Kieren McCarthy,
Haiti Kisses ICANN Ring, Rewarded with Control over Own Domain, REGISTER, at http://
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Moreover, not all political entities were included in the ISO
3166-1 list, and those omitted were understandably concerned
about how IANA's actions (or the lack thereof) could frustrate
their political aspirations. For example, the Palestinians did not re-
ceive the ".ps" domain until the ISO 3166-1 list included the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory.27 Conversely, despite its dissolution in
1991, the Soviet Union continues to exist in cyberspace, because
IANA has failed to delete the ".su" domain from the root zone
file.28 According to IANA's root-zone WHOIS information, the
".su" ccTLD is currently being phased out.29
The European Union is equally unhappy about the ISO 3166-1
codes. Despite its size and economic importance, it failed to obtain
its ".eu" name space, because the ISO 3166-1 list does not recog-
nize supranational entities.3" In September 2000, the ICANN
board finally passed a resolution approving the delegation of the
".eu" TLD.3 1 The European Commission subsequently selected
EURid as the manager of the ".eu" TLD32 and adopted the regula-
tion for the implementation and coordination of the ".eu" name
space.33
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/01/14/haitikissesicann ringrewarded/ (Jan. 14, 2004) [here-
inafter McCarthy, Haiti Kisses ICANN Ring]; Behind the Scenes of the .ht Redelegation,
ICANNWatch.org, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=04/01/26/0138212&mode=
thread (Jan. 25 2004).
27 See IANA, IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR DELEGATION OF THE .PS ToP-LEVEL
DOMAIN (2000), available at http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22marOO.htm.
28 See Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, 41; Sergey Kuznetsov, Russia May Say 'See Ya' to
Dot-Su, WIRED NEWS, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,55687,00.html (Oct. 19,
2002).
29 See IANA, Root-Zone Whois Information, at http://www.iana.org/root-whois/su.htm
(last updated Feb. 9, 2004).
30 The European Commission believed that the creation of the ".eu" TLD was justified
by "a decision by the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency to extend the reservation of the ex-
isting EU code for the purposes of the Internet." EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE CREA-
TION OF THE .EU INTERNET Top LEVEL DOMAIN 5 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/information society/policy/intemet/pdf/doteu-enpdf.
31 See Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, [ 42; see also ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT,
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE BOARD (2000), available at http://www.icann.org/minutes/pre
lim-report-25sepOO.htm.
32 See Press Release, The European Commission Chooses EURid to Manage .eu Do-
main Names, at http://www.eurid.org/News/pressrelease20030522-EN.html (May 22, 2003).
33 Commission Regulation (EC) No 874/2004 of 28 April 2004 Laying Down Public
Policy Rules Concerning the Implementation and Functions of the .eu Top Level Domain
and the Principles Governing Registration, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 40. For a discussion of the
creation of the ".eu" TLD, see generally Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, J1 42-44. For
discussions of the obstacles to the launch of the ".eu" TLD, see generally Jothan Frakes,
.EU: Lucy's Football?, at http://www.verisign.com/services/cdns/news/columnist-200406.
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Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has grown substantially in
both size and scope; it became increasingly commercial and global.
By the late 1990s, the U.S. government decided to privatize the
DNS.34 Following a request for comments from the public, the
DoC published a proposal to reform the DNS administration in
January 1998. 3s Known as the "DNS Green Paper," this proposal
mapped out the Clinton administration's domain name policy and
explained why the DoC had authority to regulate the DNS. Al-
though the Green Paper was intended to be consultative by nature,
many found the document controversial.
In light of this reaction, the DoC abandoned its original
rulemaking plan. Instead, it issued a nonbinding statement of pol-
icy that became known as the "DNS White Paper. '36 The White
Paper delineated four basic principles that were used to develop
the new DNS system, namely, "stability, competition, private bot-
tom-up coordination, and representation."'37 Noting the need to
withdraw the U.S. government from DNS administration, the pol-
icy statement called for the establishment of a private entity that
would take over the DNS. As the White Paper stated, "overall
policy guidance and control of the TLDs [top-level domains] and
the Internet root server system should be vested in a single organi-
zation that is representative of Internet users around the globe. ' 38
In addition, the White Paper noted that "neither national gov-
ernments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations
acting as representatives of governments should participate in
management of Internet names and addresses. '39 Nonetheless, the
html (June 2004); Kieren McCarthy, EC Tells Europe and ICANN to Make Peace, at http:I/
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/28/ecicann warning_shot/ (Apr. 28, 2004).
34 For an excellent history of the U.S. government's efforts to privatize the DNS and
early development of ICANN, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Us-
ing ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) [here-
inafter Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace]. See also Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool
Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Priva-
tizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 89 (2001).
35 Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826-33 (Feb. 20, 1998). The Green Paper is available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm.
36 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741-51 (June 5,
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White Paper recognized the need to ensure international input into
the new DNS. It also acknowledged the authority of national gov-
ernments "to manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs."40
Finally, the White Paper identified cybersquatting-the pre-
emptive registration of trademarks as domain names by third par-
ties-as a major problem for the DNS. It called upon WIPO to
"initiate a balanced and transparent process" to provide the new
entity with recommendations on how to deal with cybersquatting.
Pursuant to this invitation, WIPO launched the First WIPO In-
ternet Domain Name Process, a lengthy and extensive global con-
sultative process that involved consultation meetings in fourteen
countries in six continents and the participation of a large number
of government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, profes-
sional associations, corporations, and individuals.4"
Shortly after the DoC published the White Paper, ICANN was
incorporated as a private not-for-profit corporation in California,
with Postel as its chief technical officer and a board of directors
that has limited knowledge of the Internet and domain name mat-
ters.42 In November 1998, the DoC entered into an agreement
with ICANN concerning the transfer of DNS management.4a To
40 Id.
41 WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES: FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS 4
(1999). The final report of the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process is available at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/index.html.
42 Unfortunately, Postel died in October 1998, as a result of complications from open
heart surgery. As Professor Mueller noted, "[h]is death robbed the organization of its
moral center, a good part of its institutional memory, and most of what remained of its
legitimacy." MUELLER, RULING THE RoOT, supra note 3, at 181. For discussions and criti-
cisms of ICANN, see generally James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age,
50 DUKE L.J. 5 (2000); Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker in Cyberspace: A Power
Model, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 859 (2002); Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net, supra note
17, at 838-55; Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, supra note 34; A. Michael Froomkin
& Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Joseph P. Liu, Legiti-
macy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587
(1999); John Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN's Foray into Global Internet
Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 409 (2004); Symposium, ICANN Governance:
ICANN 2.0, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1087 (2003); Weinberg, supra note 2; Jonathan Zittrain,
ICANN: Between the Public and the Private-Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1071-93 (1999).
43 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Nov. 25, 1998, available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm. This agreement has
since been amended a number of times. The amendments are available at http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann.htm.
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take over IANA's operation, ICANN also entered into an agree-
ment with the Information Sciences Institute at the University of
Southern California, where Postel worked until his untimely
death.4
A few months later, the DoC officially recognized ICANN as
the private entity mentioned in the White Paper.45 As Professor
Michael Froomkin observed, this development was "no coinci-
dence ... The whole point of the White Paper had been to find a
more formal structure for DNS management that left it in Postel's
capable hands-and could be presented as a pro-Internet, deregu-
latory victory for the Clinton administration (and [Presidential Se-
nior Adviser] Ira Magaziner). ICANN exists because the
Department of Commerce called for it to exist."
46
Structurally, ICANN benefits from the input of its directors,
supporting organizations, and special advisory committees.47 The
committee that deals with global policy and ccTLD matters is the
Governmental Advisory Committee ("GAC"), which is regularly
attended by national governments, distinct economies, and inter-
governmental organizations, such as the ITU and WIPO. Under
the recently reformed structure, the GAC provides direct advice to
the ICANN board and appoints liaisons to the board, the commit-
tee that nominates the directors, and the various supporting
organizations.48
To "announce" its taking over of IANA's function and to em-
phasize its authority over ccTLD matters, ICANN issued ICP-1 in
May 1999. 49 Combining RFC 1591 and the ccTLD News Memo #1,
44 Contract Between ICANN and the United States Government for Performance of
the JANA Function, Feb. 9, 2000, available at http://www.icann.org/general/iana-contract-
09febOO.htm.
45 Letter from J. Beckwith Burr, Acting Associate Administrator for International
Affairs, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, to David Graves, Director, Business Affairs, Network Solutions, Inc. (Feb.
26, 1999), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icannnewco.htm.
46 Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, supra note 34, at 70.
47 Some ICANN critics have pointed out that this formal structure existed merely on
paper, not in reality. For ICANN's recent reform in December 2002, see infra text accom-
panying notes 62-64.
48 ICANN, ICANN AND THE GLOBAL INTERNET 4 (2003), available at http://www.itu.
int/itudoc/itu-t/workshop/cctld/024rl.html. See generally Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, From
Self-governance to Public-Private Partnership: The Changing Role of Governments in the
Management of the Internet's Core Resources, 36 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1115-18 (2003),
for discussion of the GAC.
49 IANA, ICP-1: Internet Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (ccTLD Ad-
ministration and Delegation) (May 1999), available at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-l.htm
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this document strengthened the power of national governments on
ccTLD matters. As it stated, "[t]he desires of the government of a
country with regard to delegation of a ccTLD are taken very seri-
ously. The IANA will make them a major consideration in any
TLD delegation/transfer discussions. '5°
In February 2000, the GAC presented to ICANN the Princi-
ples for Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs ("GAC Princi-
ples"),"1 which ICANN later used extensively to justify their
redelegation efforts. Although the GAC Principles sought to pro-
vide "the model for institutionalizing the relationship between
ICANN, ccTLD delegations, and the relevant national govern-
ments or public authorities, '"52 many found the document contro-
versial and antithetical to the interests of ccTLD managers.
Since its establishment, ICANN, acting as IANA, has dele-
gated the ".ps" domain to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, de-
leted Zaire's ".zr" in response to the country's change of name,53
and redelegated more than a dozen other ccTLDs, including Ca-
nada's ".ca," Australia's ".au," and Japan's ,,.jp.,, 54 ICANN also
approved the partial redelegation of Libya's ".ly," whose name
[hereinafter ICP-1]. Although some commentators refer to ICP-1 as the "Internet Coordi-
nation Policy," the document stands for "ICANN Corporate Policy." See ICANN, Propo-
sal to the U.S. Government to Perform the IANA Function (Feb. 2, 2000), available at
http://www.icann.org/general/iana-proposal-02febO.htm.
50 ICP-1, supra note 49.
51 GAC, ICANN, Principles for Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs Presented
by Governmental Advisory Committee (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter GAC Principles], avail-
able at http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/gac-cctldprinciples-23febO.htm.
52 MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 206. As the GAC Principles noted:
The relevant government or public authority ultimately represents the interests
of the people of the country or territory for which the ccTLD has been dele-
gated. Accordingly, the role of the relevant government or public authority is
to ensure that the ccTLD is being administered in the public interest, whilst
taking into consideration issues of public policy and relevant law and
regulation.
GAC Principles, supra note 51, § 5.1.
53 In 1997, Zaire changed its name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has
since occupied the .cd name space. See IANA, REPORT ON DELETION OF THE ZR Top-
LEVEL DOMAIN (2001), available at http://www.iana.org/reports/zr-report-20jun0l.htm.
54 Documents concerning the redelegation of these ccTLDs are available at http://
www.iana.org/reports/cctld-reports.htm. As of this writing, these ccTLDs include, in
chronological order, Pitcairn Island's ".pn," Canada's ".ca," Australia's ".au," Japan's ".jp,"
Burundi's ".bi," Malawi's ".mw," Laos' ".1a," Sudan's ".sd," Kenya's ".ke," Afghanistan's
".af," Uzbekistan's ".uz," Taiwan's ".tw," Tajikistan's ".tj," Palau's ".pw," Cayman Islands'
".ky," Moldova's ".md," Haiti's ".ht," Nigeria's ".ng," and the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory's ".ps."
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server ceased functioning in April 2004, 55 and is working on the
redelegation of Iraq's ".iq" as of this writing.56 With the exception
of Canada, ICANN has entered into contractual relationships with
all of the new ccTLD managers upon full redelegation.57 Virtually
all of these redelegation efforts seem uncontroversial, as they re-
quire only one report; only Australia and Japan require two
reports.58
In addition, ICANN has been working actively with other
ccTLD managers to document their relationships. These relation-
ships vary greatly with respect to the type of organization, manage-
ment policies, economics, language, culture, legal environment,
and relations with governments.59 While ICANN expected ccTLD
managers to enter into contracts in which they would acknowledge
ICANN's authority and would agree to contribute fees to the or-
ganization,60 the managers refused. Instead, the managers ques-
tioned ICANN's authority and criticized the organization for its
lack of openness, accountability, and representation.
In February 2002, then-ICANN President Stuart Lynn openly
admitted the need for reforms, which critics had advocated since
ICANN's establishment.61 He wrote, "if ICANN comes to be seen
55 See ICANN, Approved Board Resolutions, Meeting No. 7/2004 (29 June 2004),
available at http://icann.org/minutes/resolutions-29junO4.htm; see also Kieren McCarthy,
Dr Hosni Tayeb and the Case of the Disappearing Internet, REGISTER, at http:l/
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/16/why-libyanet-fell (Apr. 16, 2004) (reporting the outage
of the ly ccTLD); ICANN, Update Concerning Recent Outage of the .ly TLD, at http://
www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-14aprO 4 .htm (Apr. 14, 2004) (same).
56 Donna Leinwand, Iraq Seeks '.iq' Domain to Make Its Mark on Net, USA TODAY,
June 4, 2004, at 6B; see also Kieren McCarthy, Iraq, Its Domain and the 'Terrorist-Funding'
Owner, REGISTER, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/04/09/iraq-its-domain (Apr. 9,
2003) (reporting about the previous manager of .iq ccTLD); Brian McWilliams, IQ Test for
Rebuilding Iraqi Net, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58406,00.
html (Apr. 10, 2003) (same).
57 See McCarthy, Haiti Kisses ICANN Ring, supra note 26 (criticizing ICANN's redele-
gation process). Notably, ICANN did not enter into an agreement with Neustar, the ".us"
ccTLD manager. See Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, T 37.
58 See IANA, SECOND IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR REDELEGATION OF THE .AU
ToP-LEVEL DOMAIN (2001), available at http://www.iana.org/reports/au-report-19novOl.
htm; IANA, SECOND IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR REDELEGATION OF THE .JP Top-
LEVEL DOMAIN (2002), available at http://www.iana.org/reports/p-report-OlaprO2.htm.
59 ICANN, ccTLD Resource Materials, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds (last updated Jan.
13, 2003).
60 See Model ccTLD Sponsorship Agreement-Triangular Situation (Initial Version),
Sept. 2, 2001, available at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/model-tscsa-02sepOl.htm; see also
Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, TT[ 32-34 (discussing ICANN's contractual powers).
61 STUART LYNN, ICANN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR REFORM
(2002), available at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm.
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.. as simply a tool of the U.S. Government, it will no longer have
any hope of accomplishing its original mission. ' 62 Seeking to rec-
oncile the organization's relationship with ccTLD managers, the
proposal recommended that ICANN replace the five at-large
board seats with government representatives.
In December 2002, ICANN finally completed its reforms, be-
ginning what some commentators have called "ICANN 2.0. ''63
Under the new structure, ICANN has a volunteer board of direc-
tors, including fifteen voting members and six non-voting liaisons,
all of whom are to be selected by ICANN's Nominating Commit-
tee, supporting organizations, and special advisory committees. 64
To facilitate the interests of ccTLD managers and national
governments, a new Country Code Domain Name Supporting Or-
ganization ("ccNSO") was established.65 Under this new structure,
ccTLD managers dissatisfied with ICANN's policies can appeal to
the ccNSO to determine whether the consensus policies apply to
62 Id.
63 See ICANN, ICANN AND THE GLOBAL INTERNET, supra note 48; ICANN, ICANN
AND REFORM (2003), available at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/workshop/cctld/025rl.html;
Hearings on the Internet Corporation Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Paul Twomey, President and CEO, ICANN), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=889&wit id=2470. For articles dis-
cussing ICANN reforms, see generally Symposium, ICANN Governance, supra note 42.
64 The fifteen directors include the President, eight voting members selected by the
Nominating Committee, and two each by the Address Supporting Organization ("ASO"),
the Country Code Names Supporting Organization ("ccNSO"), and the Generic Names
Supporting Organization ("GNSO"). Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, as amended Oct. 13, 2003, art. VI, § 2(1) [hereinafter ICANN By-
laws], available at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-13octO3.htm. The
six non-voting liaisons are appointed, respectively, by the Governmental Advisory Com-
mittee ("GAC"), the Root Server System Advisory Committee ("RSSAC"), the Security
and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC" or "SECSAC"), the Technical Liaison Group("TLG"), the At-Large Advisory Committee ("ALAC"), and the Internet Engineering
Task Force ("IETF"). Id. § 9(1).
65 The ccNSO was established upon the enrollment of thirty ccTLD managers with at
least four within each geographic region as stated in ICANN's Bylaws. See Formation of
the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO), at http://ccnso.icann.org/
announcements/ccnso-statement-OlmarO4.pdf (Mar. 1, 2004). The ccNSO was charged
with the responsibility "for developing and recommending to the Board global policies
relating to country-code top-level domains, nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's com-
munity, including the name-related activities of ccTLDs, and coordinating with other
ICANN Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN." Web
site of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization, at http://ccnso.icann.org/ (last
visited July 23, 2004).
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the concerned ccTLDs. 66 After all, "ICANN was not designed at
its creation to have direct oversight of ccTLD policy."' 67 By adding
this structure, ICANN seeks to protect itself from sensitive na-
tional sovereignty issues.
While ICANN remains relevant to the ccTLD debate, the in-
creasing concern of ccTLD managers and national governments
over ccTLD policymaking might affect how ICANN develops its
policy. As Kenneth Cukier pointed out, ccTLD managers have the
potential to control ICANN's future: "The confederation of inde-
pendent ccTLD administrators could bring ICANN vitally-needed
legitimacy and funding if it formally recognizes the authority of
ICANN and pay it [sic] fees. Conversely, if the ccTLD community
continues to balk from establishing a formal relationship with
ICANN, it would weaken the institution."68 In fact, if the ccTLD
managers can convince the DoC that ICANN cannot handle
ccTLD matters, the DoC might decide not to renew ICANN's
contract.69
66 ICANN Bylaws, supra note 64, art. IX, § 4(11). Article IX of ICANN's Bylaws pro-
vides, in relevant part:
[Any ccTLD manager who becomes a ccNSO member] may provide a declara-
tion to the ccNSO Council stating that (a) implementation of the policy would
require the member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied
in the applicable law described in paragraph 10 of this Section), and (b) failure
to implement the policy would not impair DNS operations or interoperability,
giving detailed reasons supporting its statements. After investigation, the
ccNSO Council will provide a response to the ccNSO member's declaration. If
there is a ccNSO Council consensus disagreeing with the declaration, which
may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more members of the ccNSO Council,
the response shall state the ccNSO Council's disagreement with the declaration
and the reasons for disagreement. Otherwise, the response shall state the
ccNSO Council's agreement with the declaration. If the ccNSO Council dis-
agrees, the ccNSO Council shall review the situation after a six-month period.
At the end of that period, the ccNSO Council shall make findings as to (a)
whether the ccNSO members' implementation of the policy would require the
member to breach custom, religion, or public policy (not embodied in the appli-
cable law described in paragraph 10 of this Section) and (b) whether failure to
implement the policy would impair DNS operations or interoperability. In
making any findings disagreeing with the declaration, the ccNSO Council shall
proceed by consensus, which may be demonstrated by a vote of 14 or more
members of the ccNSO Council.
Id.
67 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, ICANN AND INTERNET GOVERN-
ANCE: GETING BACK TO BASICS 13 (2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/2004
0713_cdt.pdf.
68 CUKIER, supra note 24, at 2.
69 Most recently, the DoC and ICANN agreed to extend their joint MOU for three
additional years until September 30, 2006. Press Release, ICANN and U.S. Department of
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Apart from ccTLD managers, national governments have
played an increasingly important role in the ccTLD debate. In a
recent survey, Professor Michael Geist found a diverse array of re-
lationships between national governments and ccTLD managers.7 0
While government agencies and departments manage ten ccTLDs,
national governments have contractual or informal relationships
with many others.71 Some registries, like those in Canada and the
United States, also create a relationship between the country and
the domain name registrants by requiring local presence as a pre-
requisite to registration.72
Today, national governments recognize ccTLDs "as a compo-
nent of their sovereignty and a vital national interest. ' 73 Realizing
that ccTLDs may denote the "brand of the country," some govern-
ments openly embrace ccTLDs as "a platform for national eco-
nomic growth and the institutions of civil society brought online. ' 74
Some, like Tuvalu, even use ccTLDs as a revenue-generating
Commerce Announce New Three- Year Agreement, at http://www.icann.org/announcements/
announcement-17sep03.htm (Sept. 17, 2003).
70 See MICHAEL A. GEIST, ccTLD Governance Project, at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-
t/workshop/cctld/cctld006.html (Dec. 10, 2002); see also MICHAEL GEIST, GOVERNMENTS
AND COUNTRY-CODE TLDs: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2003), available at http://www.michael
geist.ca/geistgovernmentcctlds.pdf.
71 As Professor Geist stated:
Forty-seven percent [of the fifty-six countries that responded to the survey] in-
dicated that they retain ultimate control in one of four ways. First, many gov-
ernments directly operate the national ccTLD as part of a government ministry
or agency. Second, some governments have established a subsidiary company
of a government ministry or agency to manage their ccTLD. Third, several
governments have enacted legislation granting themselves final authority over
their ccTLD's operations. Fourth, a number of governments have entered into
operational contracts with their national ccTLD manager in which they assert
their ultimate authority over the ccTLD, but grant their approval to a non-
governmental ccTLD manager.
MICHAEL GEIST, GOVERNMENTS AND COUNTRY-CODE TLDs: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2003),
available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/geistgovernmentcctlds.pdf.
72 Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, 21.
73 CUKIER, supra note 24, at 1. As Professor Mueller explained:
Just as the physical world was divided up into mutually exclusive territories
controlled by sovereign governments, so could the name space be. Country
codes were the most direct and obvious point of entry for this kind of thinking.
If national governments could gain control over the assignment of their own
country code, they could translate their geographic jurisdictions into cyber-
space and gain a significant role for themselves in Internet governance.
MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 205.
74 CUKIER, supra note 24, at 1.
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source, selling off rights in its name space for tens of millions of
dollars.75
As ccTLDs become increasingly important, national govern-
ments begin to assert control over the administration of their
ccTLDs. For example, Australia, Canada, and Japan have peti-
tioned ICANN for the redelegation of their domains. Likewise,
the European Union is working closely with ICANN to create the
66 76
.eu" name space.
Not all governments, however, are interested in working with
ICANN. Some prefer to act alone, or to abandon ICANN for a
more favorable international forum, such as the ITU.77 Indeed,
some governments have already sought to use national legislation
to regulate local ccTLD managers. The government of South Af-
rica, for instance, recently introduced legislation to reclaim control
of the ".za" name space from the incumbent ccTLD manager. 8
Similarly, during the controversial redelegation of the ".au" do-
main, the Australian government reminded ICANN that "as a last
resort the Australian Government could invoke legislation relating
to the self-regulation of the domain name system.
' 79
Legally, some governments can consider using the "eminent
domain" doctrine (or its equivalent), 80 which, if applicable, allows
governments to take away private property at fair market value to
promote an overriding public interest.81 Given the socio-economic
importance of a ccTLD, these governments are likely to be able to
convince the courts that their actions are constitutional. Nonethe-
less, such governmental action might be undesirable, as it would
75 Kate Mackenzie, Tuvalu's .tv Yields $88m, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 29, 2002, at 27.
76 For discussion of the European Union's approach to ICANN, see generally Herbert
Burkert, About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at Describing and Understanding
Some Elements of the European Union Approach to ICANN, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1185
(2003).
77 See, e.g., Akash Kapur, United Nations vs. ICANN: One ccTLD at a Time, CIR-
CLEID, at http://www.circleid.com/articles/2564.asp (Jan. 29, 2003). See also Kleinwaechter,
supra note 48, at 1119-20 (discussing the role of the ITU in DNS governance).
78 In March 2002, the government of South Africa introduced the Electronic Communi-
cations and Transactions Bill, which proposed to set up a new domain name authority
within South Africa with board members chosen by the Minister of Communications. See
Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, 23; Geist, ccTLD Governance Project, supra note 70.
79 Letter from Richard Alston, Senator and Minister for Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts, Australia, to M. Stuart Lynn, President and CEO, ICANN (July
4, 2001), available at http://www.iana.org/cctld/au/alston-to-lynn-04jul0l.htm.
80 CUKIER, supra note 24, at 6; see also id. (outlining a plan to nationalize ccTLDs).
81 See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 505-12
(2d. ed., 1993); NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (Perm. ed., 2003).
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bring formal political control over the ccTLD system and impose
constraints on the DNS that ICANN was designed to prevent.82
To break free of ICANN, governments can join together to
establish an alternative root zone file, or a system of root zone
files, that replaces the current root zone file. ICANN's governance
structure is premised on the general consensus that there can be
only one authoritative root zone file, lest there be inefficiency, in-
connectivity, economic injury, or even chaos in the DNS. How-
ever, if governments become so frustrated with ICANN that they
would rather risk infrastructure damages than remain subjected to
an overbearing "Leviathan," many might consider alternative root
zone files desirable. 83
Finally, in the absence of ICANN's intervention or oversight,
the international community can work together to develop a "code
of practice" to promote harmonization and compliance while mini-
mizing disputes. For example, they can draft an international
treaty that sets the parameters of ccTLD management and admin-
istration practice. They also can work together to develop a non-
binding document that provides guiding principles to ccTLD man-
agers and national governments.
A case in point is the WIPO ccTLD Best Practices for the Pre-
vention and Resolution of Property Disputes,84 which WIPO re-
leased in June 2001. This document provides voluntary guidelines
concerning registration practices and dispute resolution proce-
dures. These guidelines were particularly needed, because ccTLD
managers retain the power to set policies for their domain. For
example, they can decide whether registrants have to be residents
of the country, whether they are subject to the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy ("UDRP"), and whether their personal informa-
tion will be displayed on a publicly available WHOIS database.
82 CUKIER, supra note 24, at 6.
83 See Arx & Hagen, supra note 13, 83 (advocating the acknowledgment by national
governments that each nation is authoritative for its respective ccTLD and the introduction
of a peer-to-peer protocol into the DNS). Theoretically, any computer can resolve domain
names by querying different name servers that point to different root servers. Alternative
top-level domains and alternative root servers indeed exist. Nonetheless, very few com-
puters look up domain names using alternative root servers, and the vast majority rely on
the set of thirteen "legacy" root servers to resolve domain names. See MUELLER, RULING
THE ROOT, supra note 3, at 53-55; Weinberg, supra note 2, at 197-98.
84 The WIPO ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of Property Dis-
putes is available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cctld/bestpractices/index.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2004). The document is available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Spanish, and Russian.
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Of notable interest is the final section of this document, which
advocates the adoption of the UDRP in the absence of any con-
trary local privacy regulations. Introduced in October 1999, the
UDRP set forth the terms and conditions related to a dispute be-
tween the registrant and a third party over the registration and use
of a domain name.86 Although commentators have criticized the
UDRP for its procedural weaknesses, 87 the policy has been widely
acclaimed for its simplicity and cost-effectiveness in resolving
trademark disputes. Since the UDRP entered into force in Decem-
ber 1999, thousands of cases have been filed, and the majority of
these cases has been resolved satisfactorily and efficiently.
In recent years, the ITU, like WIPO, has begun to play a much
larger role in the ccTLD debate. In December 2003, the ITU con-
ducted the first phase of the World Summit on the Information So-
ciety ("WSIS") in Geneva, bringing together national leaders,
government officials, corporate executives, industry experts, and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations and civil society.
At this summit, government leaders from less developed countries
and representatives of civil society expressed great concern over
ICANN's illegitimate and arbitrary role in Internet governance, its
close ties to the U.S. government, and its failure to take account of
interests of other nations.
85 The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy is available at http://www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last updated May 17, 2002).
86 Under the UDRP, each registrant agrees to participate in a mandatory administra-
tive proceeding when a third party complains to a dispute resolution service provider. The
person bringing the case must then prove not only that the registrant's domain name is
identical, or confusingly similar to a trademark, or service mark, in which the complainant
has rights, but also that the person who registered the domain has no rights to, or legiti-
mate interests in, the domain name and the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.
87 Among the criticisms are the selection and composition of the dispute resolution
panel, the failure to provide adequate time for a domain name registrant to reply to a
complaint, the failure to ensure that the registrant has received actual notice of the com-
plaint, and the registrant's limited access to courts for review when the dispute resolution
panel decides against a party. For criticisms of the UDRP, see generally Michael Geist,
Fair. Corn?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN
UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dis-
pute Resolution Policy"-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002). See
also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-national Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
141 (2001); Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, supra note 34; MILTON MUELLER,
ROUGH JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ICANN's UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
(2003), available at http://www.acm.org/usacm/IG/roughjustice.pdf.
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Interestingly, ICANN and the DNS represent only a small
portion of the Internet governance issue, and even a smaller por-
tion of the information society debate. Other issues include pri-
vacy, spam, online pornography, hate speech, cybersecurity,
identity theft, cyberstalking, and intellectual property rights. Nev-
ertheless, ICANN has attracted major attention from the delegates.
At the end of the summit, the delegates were unable to reach a
consensus. Instead, they called upon United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Anan to create a special working group on Internet
governance. As the WSIS Declaration of Principles, one of the
summit's two key documents, stated:
International Internet governance issues should be addressed in
a coordinated manner. We ask the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to set up a working group on Internet govern-
ance, in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism
for the full and active participation of governments, the private
sector and civil society from both developing and developed
countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and interna-
tional organizations and forums, to investigate and make pro-
posals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet
by 2005.88
Once established, this working group will study the Internet
governance issue; consult with experts from governments, the pri-
vate sector, and civil society; and provide policy recommendations,
if applicable, in the summit's second phase in Tunis in November
2005. By setting up this working group, the international commu-
88 WSIS Declaration of Principles 50 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/
dms-pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/SO3-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf; see also David McGuire,
U.N. Sets Aside Debate over Control of Internet, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2003, at E5. Accord-
ing to the complementary WSIS Plan of Action, this working group should, inter alia:
i) develop a working definition of Internet governance;
ii) identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance;
iii) develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibili-
ties of governments, existing intergovernmental and international organisations
and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society from both devel-
oping and developed countries;
iv) prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for consider-
ation and appropriate action for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.
WSIS Plan of Action 13(b) (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-s/
md/03/wsis/doc/SO3-WSIS-DOC-0005!!PDF-E.pdf; see also Kieren McCarthy, Internet
Showdown Side-stepped in Geneva, REGISTER, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/12/08/
internet_showdownsidestepped-in-geneva/ (Dec. 8, 2003); Bill Thompson, World Summit
Is Wholesale Triumph, REGISTER, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/12/12/worldsummit
iswholesale_triumph/ (Dec. 12, 2003).
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nity successfully rejuvenated the participation of intergovernmen-
tal organizations in the ccTLD debate.
Immediately after the summit, various intergovernmental or-
ganizations began to jockey for political positions in anticipation of
the establishment of the U.N. working group. For example, in Feb-
ruary 2004, the ITU conducted a Workshop on Internet Govern-
ance, which sought to "provide a forum for invited experts to
exchange views and make analytical studies on definitions, view-
points and visions on Internet governance from several aspects, in-
cluding legal, technological, administration and commercial
issues."89 A month later, the United Nations Information and
Communication Technologies Task Force conducted its Global Fo-
rum on Internet governance in New York, with the stated goal of
providing "an opportunity for all relevant stakeholders-including
those who are not members of the Task Force-to engage in an
open discussion of all aspects of Internet governance."9
Most recently, ICANN and the ITU jointly sponsored a work-
shop on ccTLDs, which immediately followed the ICANN's meet-
ing in Kuala Lumpur. As stated on its Web site, this open
workshop was conducted "to focus on the operation and practical
operational issues facing the ccTLDs and to give the opportunity
for ccTLD operators and ITU Member States to share their exper-
iences." 91 While the cooperation between ICANN and the ITU
represents a promising development, this arrangement strongly
suggests the highly sensitive nature of ccTLD governance after
WSIS.
Over the next few years, the struggle for control of the DNS
and ccTLD delegations is likely to continue, or perhaps even esca-
late. There is little doubt that the ccTLD policymaking story will
still include ICANN, IANA, ccTLD managers, national govern-
ments, GAC, ITU, and WIPO. The story will also feature new,
emerging players, such as CCNSO, CENTR (Council of European
89 The Web site of the ITU Workshop on Internet Governance is available at http://
www.itu.int/osg/spu/forum/intgov04/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
90 The Web site of the Sixth Meeting of the United Nations Information and Communi-
cation Technologies Task Force is available at http://www.unicttaskforce.org/sixthmeeting/
(last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
91 The Web site for the Joint ICANN/ITU ccTLD Workshop is available at http://
www.icann.org/meetings/kualalumpur/icann-itu-t-workshop-03junO4.htm (last visited Aug.
24, 2004).
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National Top-Level Domain Registries), 92 powerful individual
ccTLD managers,93 intellectual property rights holders, Internet
service providers, and major telecommunications and information
technology companies. As a result, few can forecast how the future
will unfold, and it can only become more intriguing.
To help us better understand ICANN, the international do-
main name system, the ccTLD debate, and quasi-governmental
lawmaking processes, the Cardozo Intellectual Property Law Pro-
gram and the Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative
Law co-sponsored the "ICANN, ccTLD, and the Legacy Root: Do-
main Name Lawmaking and Governance in the New Millennium"
Symposium on March 17, 2003. This event brought together aca-
demics, legal practitioners, government officials, and representa-
tives of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.
What follows are some of the papers presented at this Symposium.
I hope you will enjoy them.
92 CENTR is an international association of ccTLD registries. CENTR provides a fo-
rum to discuss policy matters concerning ccTLD registries, acts as a channel of communica-
tion to Internet governing bodies and related organizations, and promotes the interests of
not-for-profit ccTLDs by lobbying on their behalves. Although CENTR has a European
focus, full membership is open to all ccTLD registries. Among the non-European mem-
bers are CIRA (for Canada), IPM (for Iran), ISOC-IL (for Israel), and the Palestinian
Registry. The CENTR's Web site is available at http://www.centr.org.
93 Examples of these powerful ccTLD managers include Nominet UK (".uk") and
DENIC (".de"), each of which has millions of registrations. See Michael Geist, Govern-
ments Hold Reins in Those National Domains, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10, 2003, at 3D.
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